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Abstract
Studies of locally distributed social policy schemes, and their central-local regulations and 
outcomes have mostly focused on single benefit schemes. However, the landscape of local 
social policy and access to social rights is more complex. A variety of local social policy 
schemes with various regulative structures can exist side-by-side within a welfare state, and 
often both central and local governmental levels have regulative powers for these. We assume 
that this complex web of central-local regulations of local social policy and the changes 
thereto has consequences. In this study, we scrutinise the regulative structures and spending 
patterns of all locally distributed benefit schemes in a single country (Estonia) and analyse 
their impact on inter-municipal inequality. We find that the central steering of local schemes is 
not per se a guarantee for lower/stable inter-municipal inequality. The results also emphasise 
the complexity of central-local regulations within the country and point to unintended 
consequences of reforms. In the case of Estonia, we identify processes of silent centralisation 
in locally distributed benefit schemes.
Key words: locally distributed benefit schemes, access to social rights, inter-municipal 
inequality, regulative structure, silent (de)centralisation.
Introduction
The implications of the regulative structures of local social policy schemes have long been 
on the political and academic agenda (e.g. Bruch et al., 2018). Researchers from fields such as 
federalism, intergovernmental relations and public administration have drawn attention to the 
issue of spatial inequality, asking whether a decentralisation of benefits results in a geographically 
uneven distribution of resources or access to social policy schemes. Discussions also concern the 
debate over which governmental level is the most adequate for each specific task (Gainsborough, 
2003; Pollitt, 2005; Meyers & Gornick, 2005; Kazepov, 2010; Minas et al., 2018; Bruch et al., 2018). 
However, most of the research has concentrated on single benefit schemes, their generosity and 
local variations within a country. The reality is, however, more complicated.
In contemporary welfare states, cash benefit schemes are an important part of social policy in 
mitigating poverty and providing financial support when certain social risks emerge. From an 
institutional perspective, these schemes can be roughly divided into nationally regulated and 
distributed benefit schemes with no political autonomy or discretion at the subnational level, 
and schemes that include at least some degree of political autonomy or discretion for subnational 
regulations, whether in financing, rulemaking and/or administration. Regarding the former, 
eligibility criteria, compensation level, administration and financing procedures are similar all over 
a country, irrespective of local conditions, and thus, the place of residence within the country is 
insignificant in receiving the benefit. In contrast, regulations governing locally distributed benefit 
schemes are determined in various ways by both central and local (regional and/or municipal) 
governments. Local authorities can thus take into account the conditions of a given territorial 
context, and as a consequence, the distribution of a benefit can vary within the country. For locally 
distributed schemes, residency can play an important role. Living in a certain municipality can 
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considerably increase or reduce access to local social policy programmes (Martinelli, Anttonen, 
& Mätzke, 2017). Local autonomy and central steering are crucial elements in the empirical and 
theoretical debate over central-local regulations and the resulting implications for access to social 
policy schemes and social rights (Daly, 2002). As previous studies have shown, municipal spending 
patterns (for example in terms of generosity) and inter-municipal inequalities (e.g. Bruch, Meyers, 
& Gornick, 2018; Hölsch & Kraus, 2004) are indications of the variations in access to local social 
policy programmes.
In many countries, several locally distributed benefit schemes with different regulative structures, 
social policy goals and target groups exist side-by-side (Frazer & Marlier, 2016). Although all of 
these benefit schemes are a local responsibility, both central and subnational governments often 
have regulative powers regarding rulemaking, financing and/or administration, but in varying 
ways (Bruch et al., 2018). However, regardless of the regulative structure and the source of funding 
(state or local), these benefits are often distributed through local budgets. We assume that these 
regulative structures of local benefit schemes within a territory (here municipality) affect local 
spending – overall as well as within single schemes. For instance, altered benefit standards in 
one (centrally steered but locally distributed) benefit scheme might force municipalities to adapt 
local benefit levels and/or eligibility criteria in other scheme(s) in order to keep the local budget 
balanced. Yet, local authorities often have multiple choices in reacting to these changes. Depending 
on their power of autonomy in benefit schemes, they can use different ways to determine who 
gets how much support (e.g. choosing to provide services instead of benefits, etc.). Therefore, the 
spending pattern for one benefit scheme might be altered not only by changes in that specific 
scheme, but also by decisions made in other locally distributed benefit schemes. 
The possible interdependence between locally provided schemes shows a limitation of studies 
concentrating on single schemes. This stresses the importance of including the overall regulative 
landscape of locally distributed benefit schemes and the outcome in terms of spending patterns 
and inter-municipal inequalities. The purpose of our study is thus to scrutinise the regulative 
structures and spending patterns of all locally distributed benefit schemes in a given country, and 
to analyse changes over time and their impact on inter-municipal inequality. Empirically, we direct 
attention to a package of locally distributed cash benefits and their interdependence regarding 
spending patterns and inter-municipal inequalities. This design is an extension of an approach used 
in previous local governance studies which have, however, concentrated on single schemes. We will 
go further by: a) categorising the regulative structures of all local cash benefit schemes according 
to a set of dimensions used in the literature on decentralisation; and b) defining spending patterns 
and estimating inter-municipal inequality by using the concepts of relevance and generosity. The 
Gini coefficients will be used as a measure of inequality in distribution in order to estimate inter-
municipal inequality over time and to compare the single schemes and their interdependence. 
We analyse the locally distributed benefit schemes in Estonia. A single country study allows us 
to compare in-depth regulative structures and spending patterns of various local cash benefit 
schemes, which all function in the same welfare state and in the same general context. Since 
inter-municipal inequality may also be affected by changes in the number of subnational units, the 
study covers the period 2006–2016, when no major administrative-territorial reforms took place. 
The number of municipalities stayed relatively stable with only some voluntary mergers (reduction 
from 227 to 213). 
There is also an ambition to improve the theoretical and empirical discussion of the importance of 
policy design in local social policy schemes. Theoretically, we attempt to advance the debate about 
local autonomy and central steering.
The article has three parts. The first part deals with theoretical and conceptual considerations 
about local autonomy and central steering. The second part gives an overview of the institutional 
design of the Estonian welfare state with emphasis on local cash benefits. The third part includes 
the empirical study of the regulative structures, spending patterns and inter-municipal inequalities. 
The paper ends with a discussion.
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Local autonomy and central steering
The question of which governmental level should be responsible for which task has concerned 
researchers in public administration for a long time (e.g. Stoker, 1996). One strand of theory, 
namely intergovernmental relations (IGR), centres on the question of how much autonomy or 
discretion local governments have from their central government, and is concerned with processes 
and institutions through which governments within a political system interact (Agranoff, 2014; 
Goldsmith, 2002; Loughlin, 1996; Phillimore, 2013). In unitary systems, the ‘vertical’ IGR occurs in 
the relationship between the central (national) and local (subnational) governments (Phillimore, 
2013). Processes of interaction in central-local regulations include intergovernmental reforms to 
transfer power ‘downward’ or ‘upward’ to political authorities at various governmental levels; 
in other words, (de)centralisation. Obviously, central-local regulations vary between countries 
but also within a country from one policy scheme to another, with a more or less sophisticated 
functional division of governmental activities between them. Local autonomy vis-a-vis the state is 
sometimes defined as the power of initiative and immunity, where the former refers to the power 
to regulate and legislate own interests, and the latter to immunity from state government, thus 
functioning free from the oversight of any higher government tier (Clark, 1984). Without legal, 
financial and other resources provided by the central government, local governments would be 
reduced to being pure extensions of central governments unable to use local autonomy (Elander, 
1991). As Goldsmith (2002, p. 91) points out:
 “central government control – by which is meant setting the rules of the intergovernmental 
game – is a crucial piece in the establishment of local government systems, in that the position 
of local government in state systems is decided by the nature of the constitution (written 
or unwritten) and by the interpretation of and formal changes to it through legislation and 
judicial decisions.”
 
Therefore, certain constitutional and legal provisions are normally necessary to formalise forms of 
local autonomy. Their structure depends inter alia on the institutional design of the welfare state 
(Goldsmith, 2002; Bantin & Costa-Font, 2010; Sellers & Lidström, 2007), and on the type of local 
functions (Page & Goldsmith, 1985). This formalisation also implies that the limitations of local 
power in terms of initiative and immunity are defined by the central steering (Clark, 1984). 
However, the actual power balance in ‘vertical’ IGR in terms of outcomes (e.g. spending patterns) 
is not only defined by intergovernmental reforms. Institutional reforms may have unexpected 
consequences (Dubois & Fattore, 2009; Pierson, 2000), and even in cases where the formal 
intergovernmental regulative structure for decentralised functions is not changed, the actual 
power balance and spending patterns can be altered in practice. This can occur on the basis of 
changes outside the regulative power structure: for instance, by changing national/local policy 
priorities, redefining national/local eligibility criteria or introducing national/local austerity 
measures during an economic crisis (Greer, 2010; Pollitt, Bircall, & Putman, 1998). Dubois and 
Fattore (2009, p. 717) have called such indirect changes in the outcomes of intergovernmental 
regulations silent (de)centralisation.
During the last decades, a host of reforms has addressed the regulative structure of income 
protection and poverty alleviation schemes throughout Europe, and these processes often replaced 
centralised, hierarchical and rule-driven administration with decentralised management. As a 
result, subnational levels of government have acquired greater regulative responsibilities not only 
in the delivery of services (administration), but also in rulemaking and financing (Pollitt, 2005; van 
Berkel et al., 2011; Minas & Øverbye, 2010). There have also been reforms working in the opposite 
direction or showing de- and (re)centralising trends simultaneously (Minas et al., 2012; Minas et al., 
2018). In some studies, based on European social assistance schemes, different classifications were 
developed which included the degree of centralisation and local autonomy as a dimension. Hölsch 
and Kraus (2004), for example, investigated the relationship between the degree of centralisation 
in European social assistance schemes and their success in mitigating poverty. They developed 
indicators such as funding liabilities, formal decision responsibilities and regional differences 
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in benefit levels. A similar study by van Mechelen and de Maesschalck (2009) focused on the 
relationship between central steering and the adequacy of benefit levels in decentralised social 
assistance schemes. Both studies emphasise the importance of central steering and nationwide 
regulations in local policy schemes, and point out that the most ineffective or inadequate schemes 
in poverty alleviation are extremely decentralised schemes with minimal (or no) central steering. 
Eastern European countries, however, are still struggling to find an adequate balance between 
better targeting and central-local relations in poverty alleviation schemes (van Mechelen & 
de Maesschalck, 2009) in the context of high inequalities within the countries and insufficient 
protection against poverty (Nelson, 2010). Minas et al. (2018) studied the shifting responsibility 
between the national and local level of government in Scandinavian social assistance schemes 
concentrating on benefit level and caseloads. The results indicate that minor reforms implying 
a (de)centralisation of authority seem to have had little impact on benefit generosity and social 
assistance caseloads, especially when the reform did not apply to the power of the regulations 
for benefit levels or eligibility criteria (i.e. rulemaking). Meyers and Gornick (2005) and Bruch et 
al. (2016; 2018) have examined regulative structures and cross-state inequality in generosity and 
inclusion over time in eleven US social programmes. They used the dimensions of decentralised 
rulemaking, administration and financial authority. These three studies showed that inequality is 
particularly closely related to IGR in financing, administration and rulemaking. Over time, they 
observed increased cross-state inequality in the generosity of schemes with a high degree of local 
autonomy, whereas cross-state inequality in the other schemes is rather stable. Yet, they did not 
compare the generosity nor inter-municipal inequality of single schemes nor interdependence.
Estonia
First, some remarks about the choice of Estonia as a case study. In Estonia, as in transition 
countries in general, welfare reforms, including political (de)centralisation of existing social 
policy schemes and the introduction of completely new functions, are still ongoing processes. This 
allows us to follow closely the structural effects and outcomes of institutional changes in modes 
of governance. Furthermore, five locally distributed cash benefit schemes with varying regulative 
structures exist side-by-side and will be analysed jointly; this makes the case theoretically and 
empirically interesting. In addition, until 2017, Estonia was divided into more than 200 subnational 
units (municipalities). The population size in those units varied between less than 70 and more 
than 400,000 inhabitants (Statistics Estonia); that is, the difference in population size was more 
than 6 000 times with considerable variations in socio-demographic structure (Kriisk, 2019). Yet, 
Estonia has in recent years had one of lowest levels of social spending in the EU and very low 
emphasis on social services and social assistance (Kuitto, 2016).
The choice of Estonia as a case study for political (de)centralisation of locally distributed benefit 
schemes also has some limitations. As stated in the literature, local welfare systems in general 
(e.g. Ranci et al., 2014; Andreotti et al., 2012), as well as in single policy areas (e.g. Minas et al., 
2012; Kazepov, 2010) are deeply rooted within welfare state and governance traditions (Sellers & 
Lidström, 2007) and follow a certain path dependency. In the case of Estonia, the transition to a 
contemporary welfare state has led to controversial expectations and outcomes in the regulative 
structure of (local) social policy (Aidukaite, 2011). High expectations regarding liberalism and/
or individualism and high fragmentation, with in some cases extreme decentralisation, stand 
in conflict with expectations about universalism and solidarity in welfare policy (e.g. universal 
child benefits and universal access to education and health care) (Cerami & Vanhuysse, 2009). 
At the local level, this implies that extensive political and organisational autonomy (similar to 
Scandinavian countries) stands in conflict with very limited and centrally controlled fiscal 
autonomy (Swianiewicz, 2014). These circumstances have led to considerable territorial disparities, 
particularly in poverty rates. According to estimations of regional poverty mapping1 in 2011, the 
poverty rates between municipalities differ almost seven times – from 6% up to 40% (Sõstra & 
1     Model-estimated poverty rates and inequality in regions with small population size based on a combination of EU-SILC and 
Census micro-data (Sõstra & Aru, 2013). This methodology allows to estimate poverty levels in ca 25% of municipalities; other 
smaller municipalities were grouped into larger units to ensure the reliability of estimations.
Kersti Kriisk64
Aru, 2013). According to Eurostat, income inequality (Gini index) in Estonia is above average and 
in 2014 one of the highest among EU countries. In contrast, the unemployment rate in Estonia 
is below the in EU countries, except during the economic crisis; however, territorial disparities 
can be quite high. For example, in 2015, the proxy unemployment rates2 in municipalities differ 
more than five times, from 1.7 up to 9.3 (the proxy rate for Estonia was 3.4). Therefore, Estonia 
differs considerably from western European welfare states in terms of institutional design. Still, 
we are convinced that this study can add important knowledge and contribute to the theoretical 
discussion of the structure of central-local regulations and inter-municipal inequality.
Locally distributed cash benefit schemes in Estonia
Social cash benefit schemes in Estonia can be roughly divided into national and local (municipal) 
schemes. Our study focuses on cash benefit schemes distributed locally, which provide additional 
and/or targeted social protection to local inhabitants beyond national schemes. The general legal 
framework for those schemes is established through the Social Welfare Act. Five locally distributed 
schemes existed in 2016: needs-based family benefit, subsistence benefit, caregiver allowance for 
children, caregiver allowance for adults, and supplementary benefits. These benefit schemes are 
briefly described below. 
Needs-based family benefit was introduced in 2013 in order to support families with children living 
in poverty. Until then, only universal nationwide family benefit schemes existed, such as flat-rate 
child benefits and a relatively generous parental leave allowance (Ainsaar & Kesselmann, 2016). 
The scheme has been centrally regulated in terms of rulemaking (including fixed benefit levels) 
and financing (from state budget with earmarked grants), but it has left some administrative 
discretion to the local level (in carrying out means-testing), with no political autonomy to local 
councils. The use of the benefit scheme in the first two years after its introduction was limited 
(Ainsaar & Kesselmann, 2016), mainly because of the extensive bureaucracy and low compensation 
levels.
Subsistence benefit was introduced in 1995 as a locally distributed benefit scheme. It is the 
primary component of the Estonian social assistance scheme often referred to in comparative 
social assistance studies (e.g. Nelson, 2010; Avram, 2013). The scheme, financed from the state 
budget with earmarked grants distributed through the local budget, is mainly centrally regulated 
(rulemaking) and administrated. However, municipalities are obliged to adapt the scheme to local 
circumstances (particularly housing costs), but the minimum levels are set by state regulations. 
Municipalities have some autonomy in the administration of the scheme (e.g. in combining the 
allocation of the benefit with social services or in deciding on allocation procedures). According to 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, municipalities spent around 15 million 
euros of earmarked grants on subsistence benefit in 2015 (27% of total local benefit spending).
There are two caregiver allowances, one for adults and another for children. Since they have many 
similarities, they are described in the same paragraph. In general, the provision of social care to 
the elderly and to persons with a disability (including children) is the obligation of families and 
municipalities (Och, 2015). Both schemes became a municipal responsibility after decentralisation 
in 2005 (adults) and 2009 (children). The declared aim of the decentralisation reforms was to 
provide economic support to non-professional caregivers or family members with a care obligation, 
taking into account local contexts and individual needs. Earlier on, both schemes were regulated 
and distributed by the state. After the decentralisation, the schemes are mainly locally regulated, 
including the autonomy to replace the allocation of allowances with alternative measures (e.g. 
social services or supplementary benefits). The regulative structure of the schemes includes, 
however, some central steering mechanisms of financing to promote their local implementation. 
(In)direct central co-funding exists in the equalisation fund calculation formula (adults), or as fixed 
lump sums added to the block grants for each caregiver allowance recipient (children). Central 
steering also includes a municipal obligation to pay social tax for some caregivers (non-working 
2     The proxy unemployment rate is calculated as share of average number of unemployed persons in a year per working age 
population (15-64) in a municipality.
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but of working age) in order to ensure pensions and health insurance rights. However, the monthly 
social tax can be up to three times higher than the actual benefit level.
Supplementary benefit scheme is an umbrella term and includes various benefits to various 
vulnerable and/or socio-demographic target groups (Ainsaar & Soo, 2012; Kriisk, 2012). In 2010, 
the municipalities allocated more than 13 different supplementary benefits on average (Kriisk, 
2012). Nevertheless, all supplementary benefits have exactly the same regulative structure, namely 
full local regulations without any element of central steering. More than half of the total local 
benefit spending goes to these benefits. It was intended that the Estonian social assistance scheme 
should consist of both the subsistence benefit (described above) and the supplementary benefits. 
However, since the introduction of the two schemes in 1995, the link between them has been 
missing in the Social Welfare Act. Both schemes remain separated and co-exist only with minimal 
regulative linkage in municipal legislation.3 Therefore, in reality, the aim of supplementary benefits 
is not exclusively to support the economic well-being of local inhabitants, but in some cases to 
attract new inhabitants and/or to inhibit outmigration with universal and generous supplementary 
benefits.
In summary, since the early 1990s until 2017, four intergovernmental social policy reforms have 
altered the regulative structure of locally distributed benefits, implying a transfer of responsibilities 
to the local level. These are the introduction of subsistence benefits and supplementary benefits 
in 1995, the decentralisation of caregiver allowances in 2005 and 2009, and the introduction of 
needs-based family benefit in 2013. It is also relevant to stress the role of the social services reform 
in 2016 that implied a national standardisation (defining of minimum standards) of local social 
service provision. Local social services have to be financed and administered by the municipalities, 
and therefore the aforementioned reform influences the distribution of limited financial resources 
within local welfare provision (including services and cash benefits).
Methodology and data
The first part of the analysis aims at categorising the five benefit schemes according to 
previously used regulative dimensions of local social policy measures: rulemaking, financing 
and administration (e.g. Minas & Øverbye, 2010; Bruch et al., 2016; 2018; van Mechelen & de 
Maesschalck, 2009), and is based on formal policy documents and legal acts. Rulemaking is defined 
as the local power to determine eligibility criteria and the content of the policy measure, as well as 
to decide over the scheme’s implementation; financing means the local power over type and usage 
of financial resources; and administration is the local power over allocation procedures. Coding 
is done according to the following scale: no local autonomy, low, medium, high, and full local 
autonomy. With this design, we partly follow Bruch et al. (2016; 2018) but have adjusted the coding 
to the Estonian context by adding the categories none and full to the local autonomy coding.4 The 
exact coding is described in Table 1.
3     Several supplementary benefits in municipalities are distributed to subsistence benefit recipients.
4     Bruch et al. (2018) have used low-medium-high local autonomy
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Table 1. Coding of local autonomy for locally distributed social policy measures
Dimension Definition Coding/Measurement 
Rulemaking Local power in defining 
eligibility criteria, 
content of local social 
policy measures, 
scheme’s 
implementation 
 
None (entirely centrally regulated) 
Low (binding state regulations with some local discretion to 
adapt the scheme to local context; implementation 
obligatory) 
Medium (local regulations according to direct national 
guidelines, obligatory) 
High (local regulations, some national guidelines, and/or 
voluntary) 
Full (entirely local regulations) 
Financing Local power over type 
and usage of financial 
resources 
None (entirely centrally financed) 
Low (mainly centrally regulated, local obligation to co-
finance) 
Medium (local financing, binding state regulations, direct 
state co-funding) 
High (local financing, some binding state regulations) 
Full (entirely local financing) 
Administration  Local power in deciding 
over allocation 
procedures of local 
social policy measure 
None (entirely centrally defined) 
Low (centrally defined, minimal professional discretion, 
centrally monitored) 
Medium (centrally defined, locally larger autonomy, centrally 
monitored) 
High (locally defined and allocated, some central guidelines, 
centrally monitored) 
Full (entirely locally defined, no monitoring) 
 
Source: based on Bruch et al. (2016, 2018), own elaborations of coding categories, and addition of 
detailed coding criteria and definitions
This categorisation will enable us to identify, generalise and compare regulative structures of locally 
distributed social policy measures, such as benefit schemes and services. These categories are then 
used in the second part of the analysis. Here the focus is on spending patterns and inter-municipal 
inequality over time and between single schemes in terms of relevance (interdependence) and 
generosity. 
For the second part of the analysis, three databases have been used: Statistics Estonia (number 
of inhabitants), disaggregated financial data about local (cash benefit) spending collected by the 
Ministry of Finance, and detailed data about local social cash benefits and recipients (except in 
case of supplementary benefits) collected by the Ministry of Social Affairs. In order to analyse 
the (unintended) effects of regulative structures in more detail and to compensate for the lack of 
reliable administrative data in some schemes, we have used the estimation of vulnerable groups 
or disaggregated spending patterns within the scheme. For the supplementary benefits scheme, 
the annual number of recipients is unknown (no reliable data exists), and therefore the generosity 
of this scheme is calculated as spending per capita and as spending per estimated number of 
vulnerable inhabitants (the added number of subsistence benefit receivers, unemployed persons 
and persons with disability). For both caregiver allowances, the disaggregated generosity and 
relevance were calculated with and without social tax. The generosity of cash benefit schemes in 
2010 is not included in the analysis because the methods of data collection were changed, and the 
number of recipients is not reliable for that year. However, this methodological change did not 
affect the data reliability of disaggregated expenditure, and therefore the relevance in year 2010 is 
included.
We use the Gini coefficient to estimate inter-municipal inequality; that is, inequality between the 
municipalities in relevance and generosity. The Gini coefficient in social sciences is mostly known 
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as a way to estimate income inequality (Sen, 1973), but also the increase or decrease of inequality 
in education, including territorial inequalities (Halffman & Leydesdorff, 2010; Zitt et al., 1999). The 
Gini coefficients are based on the calculation of the area between the line of equality and Lorenz 
curve (Sen, 1973; Özdemir, 2016). In general, the Gini coefficient is a measure of mean inequality 
in the distribution and it does not depend on the actual values or their distribution. For this study, 
we included benefit schemes with various policy goals and target groups, and this entails different 
distributions of need/demand and an a priori dissimilar distribution of spending across the country 
in terms of relevance and generosity. Our goal was to compare changes in inequality over time and 
between the schemes. Therefore, the distribution-free (in)equality measurement (Gini coefficient) 
allows us to analyse how (un)equally the cash benefits in terms of relevance and generosity are 
spread across the country.
The regulative structure of local cash benefit schemes 
When we applied the analytical framework presented earlier to the five locally distributed 
benefit schemes, a typology of regulative structures of local benefit schemes emerged showing 
three distinctive types of regulative structures (Table 2). We call these centrally framed, locally 
framed and fully locally framed schemes.5 The first type consists of centrally regulated benefit 
schemes, including needs-based family benefit and subsistence benefit. There are, however, some 
differences within this type. Financing occurs entirely at state level in both schemes, as does the 
decision on benefit levels and eligibility criteria for the needs-based family benefit. In the case 
of subsistence benefit, however, there is some local autonomy with respect to defining benefit 
levels. The actual distribution of both benefits takes place at local level, giving the municipalities 
some discretion and/or autonomy in administration, more so in the case of subsistence benefit. 
Accordingly, this type of regulative structure is called a centrally framed scheme with minimal/
some local autonomy. The second type of regulative structure is called a locally framed scheme 
with some central steering and includes both caregiver allowances. The main difference compared 
to the first type is that local power is coded high in most dimensions. A small difference exists in 
the financing dimension where central steering instruments limit local power in both caregiver 
allowance schemes, and somewhat more in the case of the allowance for children than for adults. 
The third type is a regulative structure implying complete local autonomy. That structure is only 
found in the case of supplementary benefits.
Table 2. Typology of regulative structures in Estonian locally distributed benefit schemes
Source: Social Welfare Act, other legal acts, categorisation based on coding matrix (Table 1)
5     The terms of this typology are borrowed from Kazepov (2010)
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A preliminary analysis of the regulative structures of locally distributed benefit schemes in Estonia 
reveals a varied picture. It shows that a mixed landscape of regulative structures appears behind 
locally distributed benefit schemes, where local autonomy varies considerably. This raises the 
questions of whether the regulative structure of single benefit schemes affects spending patterns 
and inter-municipal inequalities over time and how. In relation to previous research, we now ask 
if the schemes with higher local autonomy are those with higher and/or growing inter-municipal 
inequality. Furthermore, is inter-municipal inequality stable in the centrally framed schemes? We 
also want to know if the regulative structure and changes to the benefit schemes affect each 
other’s spending patterns (interdependence), and if yes, how. Therefore, in the following analyses 
we want to get closer to the connection between central-local regulations and access to social 
rights.
Spending patterns in locally distributed benefit schemes and inter-municipal 
inequalities
The second part of the analysis starts with the relevance of local cash benefits (share of spending 
on a benefit scheme in total local social benefit spending per municipality). Table 3 presents first 
the relevance of all social cash benefit schemes in the local budget, followed by general social 
spending (which also includes local social services) before moving on to single benefit schemes 
and inter-municipal inequalities. It should be emphasised that social spending does not necessarily 
include all spending on social cash benefits; some benefits under the umbrella term supplementary 
benefits may be defined by local authorities as spending on education, health care, etc. 
Table 3. Relevance of locally distributed benefit schemes and local social spending, and inter-
municipal inequalities (N number of municipalities)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
(N=227) (N=227) (N=227) (N=227) (N=226) (N=226) (N=226) (N=226) (N=215) (N=213) (N=213)
Social cash benefits in local budget 4.8 3.8 3.4 4.1 4.7 4.7 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.2 -0.6
Social spending in local budget 7.6 6.9 6.7 7.7 8.3 8.5 8.2 7.7 7.8 8.3 8.5 0.9
Needs-based family benefit 0.9¹ 1.7 9.9 9.9 8.2³
Subsistence benefit 22.9 18.9 16.6 26.2 36.4 39.1 35.9 33.3 31.6 27.0 34.5 11.6
Caregiver allowance for children 1.5² 1.8 2.0 2.4 2.7 3.2 3.1 2.8 1.0³
allowance without social tax 0.5² 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.1³
Caregiver allowance for adults 21.2 21.4 21.3 18.8 14.4 12.2 12.0 11.8 11.2 10.2 9.4 -11.8
allowance without social tax 14.4 15.6 15.1 12.4 10.0 8.7 8.4 8.1 7.6 6.9 6.5 -7.9
Supplementary benefits (fully) 55.9 59.7 62.1 53.5 47.5 46.7 49.8 51.3 52.3 49.8 43.4 -12.5
Social cash benefits in local budget 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.02
Social spending in local budget 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.01
Needs-based family benefit 0.45 0.45 0.39 0.34 -0.11
Subsistence benefit 0.37 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.31 -0.06
Caregiver allowance for children 0.61 0.58 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.08
allowance without social tax 0.61 0.61 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.18
Caregiver allowance for adults 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.15
allowance without social tax 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.38 0.43 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.21
Supplementary benefits (fully) 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.28 0.08
Not allocated
Change 
2006-2016
Average relevance (%) of all Estonian municipalities
Centrally framed schemes
Not allocated
(Fully) Locally framed schemes
Inter-municipal inequalities (Gini coefficients)
Centrally framed schemes
Not allocated
(Fully) Locally framed schemes
Not allocated
Notes: 
¹ - The scheme was introduced in July
² - The scheme was decentralised in April
³- Full years: needs-based family benefit (2014-2016) and caregiver allowance for children (2010-
2016)
Source: Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Finances; own calculations
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The general picture shows that over time, the relevance of total social spending in the municipalities 
has increased (from around 7 to 8.5%), but the relevance of local cash benefits has decreased (from 
4.8 to around 4%). Both general spending patterns were affected by the economic crisis (2009–
2011), having high peaks during the crisis and low points in pre- and post-crisis periods. In recent 
years, benefits spending has been rather stable, whereas social spending has increased. When 
distinguishing benefit schemes according to their regulative structure, we can observe considerable 
variations in trends and interdependence. While the ratio between spending in centrally and (fully) 
locally framed benefit schemes in 2006 was around 20:80, the same ratio in 2016 was 45:55. This has 
been the result of a constant increase in the relevance of centrally framed schemes, particularly 
of subsistence benefit (2009–2012), and of the needs-based family benefit (2015–2016). The steady 
decrease in relevance of the (fully) locally framed schemes is mostly a result of the decline in 
relevance of the caregiver allowance for adults, but also of supplementary benefits in recent years. 
The extent of changes is larger than expected, given the recent intergovernmental benefit reforms: 
the relevance of needs-based family benefit and of caregiver allowance for children is rather small. 
These trends and figures in spending patterns could lead to an assumption that regardless of 
nationwide priorities (the increase of relevance in centrally framed schemes), local authorities 
have shifted their priorities from cash benefit allocation to social service provision.
Although the overall inter-municipal inequality in the relevance of local social spending and 
of total benefit spending has been stable over the years, there are various trends in the inter-
municipal inequality of the single benefit schemes. Inter-municipal inequality has for example 
decreased in centrally framed schemes (Gini coefficient has fallen from around 0.45 to around 
0.3 in both schemes), increased in locally framed schemes, especially in the case of caregiver 
allowance for adults (from 0.33 to 0.48), and been relatively stable in fully locally framed schemes 
(supplementary benefits). Interestingly, the lowest inter-municipal inequality in relevance can be 
observed not in centrally framed schemes, but in fully locally framed schemes. Overall, there is 
a convergence between centrally and fully locally framed schemes in regard to inter-municipal 
inequality.
Table 4 turns our attention to generosity and inter-municipal inequalities therein both over time 
and between the schemes. Generosity of local benefit spending and of social spending (including 
social services) has increased over time – more so for local social spending than for benefits. 
Generosity of the former has increased during the period by around 66%, whereas in the case of 
total benefit spending the increase was around 33%. Mostly due to nationwide increases in benefit 
levels, the generosity of the centrally framed schemes has significantly increased over time. The 
same trend can be observed in locally framed schemes (both with and without social tax), but on 
a considerably lower level. In fully locally framed schemes (supplementary benefits), there has 
been almost no increase in generosity over the eleven-year period. Furthermore, the generosity per 
estimated vulnerable group has decreased slightly over the years.
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Table 4. Generosity per year and inter-municipal inequality of benefit schemes and local social 
spending (N number of municipalities)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Change 2006-2016
(N=227)(N=227)(N=227)(N=227)(N=226)(N=226)(N=226)(N=215)(N=213)(N=213) values %
Social cash benefits in local budget (capita)
39.89 37.66 39.13 42.03 46.50 45.30 45.95 47.59 50.09 53.29 13.4 33.6
Social spending in local budget (capita) 74.96 82.11 90.85 99.03 103.68 109.27 118.93 113.12 120.96 124.76 49.8 66.4
Needs-based family benefit (recipient) 60.36² 107.98 544.57 597.65 489.67⁴ 453.5⁴
Subsistence benefit (recipient) 213.43 245.05 269.03 258.91 428.57 409.71 410.31 459.25 454.65 601.96 388.53 182.0
Caregiver allowance for children (recipient) 397.03³ 483.61 491.18 520.14 577.36 636.00 627.22 143.61⁴ 29.7⁴
allowance without social tax 116.41³ 171.04 185.39 204.28 228.72 252.94 249.32 78.28⁴ 45.8⁴
Caregiver allowance for adults (recipient) 276.35 277.04 296.94 320.01 300.01 311.80 328.49 354.36 371.68 410.53 134.18 48.6
allowance without social tax 184.93 197.60 206.02 204.85 198.49 203.53 212.62 220.49 227.47 242.60 57.67 31.2
Supplementary benefits (capita) 21.61 22.09 24.12 22.62 21.13 21.95 25.25 24.18 23.67 22.28 0.67 3.1
Supplementary benefits (vulnerable) 130.30 148.21 166.06 115.00 107.65 116.86 128.49 140.43 141.50 126.48 -3.8 -2.9
Social cash benefits in local budget (capita)
0.25 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.02
Social spending in local budget (capita) 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.01
Needs-based family benefit (recipient) 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.17 -0.02
Subsistence benefit (recipient) 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.20 -0.02
Caregiver allowance for children (recipient) 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.55 0.55 0.04
allowance without social tax 0.42 0.49 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.12
Caregiver allowance for adults (recipient) 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.36 0.23
allowance without social tax 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.27 0.16
Supplementary benefits (capita) 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.04
Supplementary benefits (vulnerable) 0.40 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.05
(Fully) Locally framed schemes
Not allocated
Not allocated
Average generosity¹ per year in municipalities (€)
Inter-municipal inequalities (Gini coefficients)
Not allocated
Not allocated
Centrally framed schemes
Centrally framed schemes
(Fully) Locally framed schemes
 
Notes:
¹ - capita refers to generosity per inhabitant in a municipality; generosity per recipient enables to 
take in account also the structural needs in a municipality
² - The scheme was introduced in July
³ - The scheme was decentralised in April
⁴ - Full years: needs-based family benefit (2014–2016) and caregiver allowance for children (2011–
2016)
Source: Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Finances; own calculations
Over time, inter-municipal inequality in generosity has been relatively stable in local social 
spending and benefit spending, as well as in most single benefit schemes (centrally and fully locally 
framed schemes). A slight reduction in inequality can be observed in the case of the needs-based 
family benefit scheme, and a slight increase in inequality in the case of supplementary benefits. 
One exception in this picture occurred in 2008, when the inter-municipal inequality in generosity 
of subsistence benefit was significantly higher than in other years. Interestingly, inter-municipal 
inequality in both locally framed schemes follows a different trend than in the other schemes. 
Here, inter-municipal inequality in generosity grows over the years of the study regardless of the 
social tax component, with a much greater growth in the caregiver allowance for adults than that 
for children. Comparing the schemes over a longer period, the inter-municipal inequality in 2006 
was lowest in the case of a locally framed scheme (caregiver allowance for adults), followed by 
a centrally framed and fully locally framed scheme (supplementary benefits). Ten years later, the 
level of inter-municipal inequality was lowest in centrally framed schemes, followed by caregiver 
allowance for adults and fully locally framed schemes. Inter-municipal inequality was highest 
in the caregiver allowance for children. Furthermore, a central steering mechanism (social tax 
component) has an opposite effect on the inter-municipal inequality of caregiver allowance for 
adults compared to that for children. 
Inter-municipal inequality of benefit schemes is also affected by local decisions to not allocate 
and/or implement a scheme. Table 5 gives an overview of non-allocation over time, where annual 
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spending on a scheme in a municipality is 0 (zero) euros. The table depicts a large variation in non-
allocation. The most interesting trend is that the number of municipalities not allocating caregiver 
allowance for adults has risen over the years from 1 to 17 (in 2009 it jumped from 3 to 16 within 
a year). The number of municipalities not paying social tax on caregiver allowance for adults has 
increased over the years from 2 to 56 (26% of all municipalities). Looking at these figures raises the 
question of whether municipalities have used their local autonomy in rulemaking and changed the 
eligibility criteria to avoid caregivers on whose allowance they have to pay social tax – meaning 
limited access to social rights. 
Table 5. Number of municipalities which have not allocated single cash benefits in a given year 
and, in the case of caregiver allowances, also not allocated social tax
2006 2007 2008 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
(N=227) (N=227) (N=227) (N=227) (N=226) (N=226) (N=226) (N=215) (N=213) (N=213)
19 13 6 3
0 2 4 1 1 1 1 3 2 3
63 65 62 70 65 64 69
No social tax 95 88 88 88 88 82 93
1 1 2 3 16 19 18 16 16 17
No social tax 2 7 14 22 39 48 49 51 48 56
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Needs-based family benefit
Subsistence benefit
Caregiver allowance for children
Caregiver allowance for adults
Supplementary benefits
Source: Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Finances; own calculations
Discussion and conclusion
The intention of this paper is to contribute to the widely debated issue of the central-local 
regulations of social policy and access to social rights at the subnational level. Existing research 
starts with the assumption that local autonomy in benefit distribution per se results in higher 
inter-municipal inequality and stresses the importance of central steering and monitoring in 
reducing regional and/or local inequalities. Empirically, this assumption has been tested mostly 
through analysing single benefit schemes and ignoring the possible interdependence of several 
benefit schemes and/or other local social policy measures. Bearing that in mind, we wanted to 
give a more nuanced picture of the regulative landscape of locally distributed benefit schemes in 
a given country over a longer period. We therefore studied all locally distributed benefit schemes 
in Estonia, and analysed trends in spending patterns and their inter-municipal inequality in terms 
of relevance and generosity. Estonia represents a country where municipalities have extensive 
political and administrative but limited financial autonomy. They play a significant role in social 
policy and in access to social rights by providing additional and/or targeted social protection 
throughout the local inhabitants’ life cycle. This protection includes the distribution of cash 
benefits and the provision of social services. Locally distributed benefit schemes are, however, 
regulated in diverse ways. This makes the case empirically and theoretically interesting.
The main theoretical results of this study are: (i) local cash benefits are characterised by different 
central-local regulations ranging from centrally to fully locally framed schemes; (ii) trends in 
central-local powers (in spending patterns) are altered not only by reforming intergovernmental 
regulations; (iii) stronger central steering in a cash benefit scheme is not per se a guarantee for 
lower or stable inter-municipal inequality.
Discussion on local welfare systems is most often based on the regulative structure of a single 
social policy scheme seen to create variations in outcomes and in access to social rights. Our 
study, however, reveals that the picture is much more diverse. Comparing the distribution of 
local social services and cash benefits in Estonia during the period concerned, the former had 
exactly the same regulative structure (Kriisk, 2019). This structure has only been altered once (in 
2016), when certain national minimum standards for ten social services were defined; otherwise 
the municipalities have/had full autonomy in rulemaking, financing and administration for local 
social service provision. In contrast, locally distributed benefit schemes are embedded in varying 
regulative structures, with or without various regulative limitations to represent local interests 
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(power of initiative) with or without interference from the national level (power of immunity). 
This is important for our understanding of local autonomy and of strategies in reacting to changing 
circumstances (e.g. austerity measures, policy changes). While some benefits are regulated by 
the state with minimal local autonomy, municipalities can use the autonomy they have in other 
benefits in order to redirect resources and/or implement (alternative) local social policy measures/
goals in their own unique socio-economic and political context. Therefore, the distribution of local 
benefits needs to be seen in the broader structural context and the possible interdependencies this 
context can provide for the outcomes of local social policy and access to social rights.
This implies that the outcomes of locally distributed benefit schemes (here spending patterns) 
can be influenced both by reforming the intergovernmental regulations, which define the division 
of regulative powers, and by implementing regulative powers and/or by changing (social policy) 
priorities. The latter includes both national and local decisions. In the studied period, the former 
refers to two reforms in Estonia: the introduction of a needs-based family benefit (centrally framed 
scheme) and the decentralisation of the caregiver allowance for children (locally framed scheme). 
Regarding the implementation of regulative powers and changes in social policy priorities, there 
are some indications of the following factors and their complex combinations:
(i) impact of and reaction to (nationwide) austerity measures;
(ii) priority changes in nationwide local social policy (standardisation of local social
                services in 2016);
(iii) local strategies to counteract central steering (e.g. increased benefit levels 
                    and wider eligibility criteria in centrally framed schemes) or to avoid nationwide
                regulative responsibilities (social tax component in caregiver allowances);
(iv) local priority changes in social policy (providing services instead of cash benefits
               even before the standardisation of local social services in 2016).
Our empirical study of all locally distributed benefit schemes revealed considerable changes in the 
actual central-local power structure. The increased relevance of centrally framed schemes cannot 
be explained exclusively by the reforms of intergovernmental regulations; changes in trends also 
include (hidden) priority changes beyond the reforms. Behind these reforms and despite the 
official narrative of increasing municipal autonomy (decentralisation of locally framed schemes), 
other processes (such as nationwide/local austerity measures, etc.) have indirectly altered local 
authorities’ choices/priorities between the schemes, indicating eventually a silent centralisation 
(in spending patterns). It is important to note that without studying several local benefit schemes 
simultaneously, these processes would not be easy to discover and would remain hidden. This 
calls for more in-depth studies on the actual division of central-local powers and outcomes beyond 
regulations for local social policy schemes (e.g. Minas et al., 2018), including access to social 
rights, beyond single scheme comparisons.
The study also pointed out that stronger central steering does not per se lead to lower inter-
municipal inequalities, which has often been the main narrative in cross-national social assistance 
comparisons (Hölsch & Krause, 2004; van Mechelen & de Maesschalck, 2009), or in benefit schemes 
in the US (Bruch et al., 2018). Still, we can state that centrally framed schemes are associated 
with stable or decreasing inter-municipal inequalities. The complex and somewhat contradictory 
relationship between central steering and inter-municipal inequalities is revealed in the comparison 
of the three (fully) locally framed schemes. Firstly, the lack of nationwide frames in defining social 
policy goals for fully locally framed schemes and monitoring has allowed local authorities to use 
their power of initiative and immunity only according to their own interests. This, however, has 
not resulted in (excessively) high inter-municipal inequalities; on the contrary, in some aspects of 
spending patterns the inequalities have been the lowest. Secondly, the central steering of locally 
framed schemes has not attained one of the main goals in IGR: the “more” equal and harmonised 
distribution across country (Goldsmith, 2002). Regardless of central steering in these schemes, 
inter-municipal inequalities are the highest and growing. This stresses the necessity of in-depth 
studies of the regulative structures, and it might be appropriate to include the socio-economic and 
political variations in local welfare systems. 
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Although all the main results of this study emphasise the importance of studying several (local) 
policy schemes and using disaggregated spending patterns to study regulative structures and the 
outcome of local welfare systems, the study has several limitations. As mentioned, it is necessary to 
better understand the changes in regulative structures in order to understand the causes for silent 
(de)centralisation and local reactions to central steering. Due to methodological considerations, 
we concentrated on average inequality in the distribution of spending patterns and ignored 
detailed socio-economic and political contexts. As the literature states (Andreotti et al., 2012), local 
welfare systems are complex and diverse systems with unique socio-economic contexts. Therefore, 
the motives, trends and considerations in local decision-making can be assumed to be embedded 
in the local context. We studied only one aspect of the outcomes –spending patterns. However, 
regarding the institutional design of social policy, the adequacy and efficiency of the schemes are 
also relevant, as the regulative structures have an impact on access to social rights. Regardless 
of the various regulative structures, and the content and target groups of benefit schemes, one 
overarching goal of all (local) cash benefits is poverty reduction or alleviation in diverse (local) 
contexts. Therefore, further research is required to estimate the (overall) adequacy and efficiency 
of (Estonian) locally distributed benefit schemes in poverty alleviation. This, however, requires the 
detailed operationalisation and calculation of estimated poverty rates and income inequalities in 
small municipalities over time.
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